From the beginnings of Wahabism in the 18th century to the so called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, ISIS) violence has occasionally been justified in the name of Islam, which is problematic for secular and traditional scholars alike. This paper demonstrates that there are three complex, interrelated causes for this violence: foreign military intervention, Salafi-Jihadism and a utopian state founded upon faith and justice, i.e. a caliphate.
Introduction
The so-called "Islamic State" (IS, ISIS, ISIL), by virtue of its name, forcibly imposed upon the world a religious as well as political agenda. Notorious for its gruesome execution videos, and sophisticated use of media propaganda IS killed over 9 thousand civilians in 2014 alone, the majority of which were Muslims.
1 Yet IS asserts itself as the sole authentic carrier of Islam-an otherwise diverse religious body of 1.6 billion people, boasting fourteen hundred years of history. Its political agenda is realized with every city, province and territory it conquers from the all but collapsed governments of Iraq and Syria. Its signature claim and most salient undertaking has been the return of the Islamic Caliphate, fusing classical Islamic tradition with modern political warfare. However, as a state it is unrecognized by all its neighbors in the Middle East; and as an embodiment of Islam, it has been completely rejected by Islamic clergy and the public faithful. One should, therefore, ask the question, from where does IS obtain its legitimacy for its approximately 30 thousand plus fighters? 2 How Islamic is the so-called "Islamic State?" Why does IS justify barbaric violence against Sunnis, Shi'ites, Christians and Yazidis is in the name of Islam? The fact that such minorities and still other more ancient as well as obscure groups have called greater Iraq and Syria home for two millennia is a living testament to the inherent tolerance and pluralism of traditional forms of Islam. So what are the "root
The teachings of Wahabi ideology are found readily in the numerous works of its prolific and equally dogmatic founder. Its overarching theology centers around reclaiming the unity (tawhid) of the one and only God. Its epistemology emanates from a literalist reading of hugely problematic body of prophetic tradition (hadith) and cherry picked Qur'an passages, the return to the three founding generations of Islam (salaf) as well as re-enactment of their deeds where necessary. Thus, the Muslim faithful in Arabia and throughout the Muslim world, who for generations buried their saints in above ground tombs, illustrated their holy icons and sought favor and healing through petitioning holy men and women, were accused overnight of committing blasphemy. He openly condemned Sufis (i.e. mystically and culturally inclined Muslims), Shi'ites (whom he called rafidah, i.e. rejecters of faith), Jews, Christians (nasara, i.e. Nazarenes)-all of whom were native to the Middle East-and anyone else who did not fit into his puritanical Sunni vision. 4 In doing so, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahab was bringing into practice teachings of ultraconservative Sunni-Hanbali jurists and theologians-notably Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328) and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (d. 1350)-whose sectarian sensibilities-especially the former's incitement against the Shi'a and Sufiyyah-was typically relegated to the realm of theory, or understood in the post-antebellum 13th century when the Mongols had conquered much of the Middle East. This context and its theoretical underpinnings were all but lost on Ibn 'Abd al-Wahab and his firebrand reformation. Most importantly history credits Ibn 'Abd al-Wahab for being the first modern Muslim revivalist to declare other Muslims apostates (kuffar), accuse them of committing idolatry (shirk) and innovation (bid'ah), and at times waging a religious war (jihad) against them. 5 It is important to note that the cultural background of Wahabism was that of early 18th century Nejd. Its tribalism and warfare, reflected the region's remote, 3 Natana DeLong-Bas, Wahabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, London; New York: I.B. Taurus, 2007, 34-35 illustrates Ibn Sa'ud rather than Ibn 'Abd al-Wahab as the main impulse behind the conquests. 4 On Ibn 'Abd al-Wahab's unequivocal condemnation of the Shi'ah see Wahabi Islam, [84] [85] [86] [87] [88] [89] [90] [19] [20] [21] [22] [62] [63] [64] [65] 221. un-cosmopolitan and sterile nature, the likes of which remained unconquered by the great Ottoman or Safavid empires.
6
However, Muhammad b. 'Abd Al-Wahab was not the only Islamic revivalist (mujaddid) of his age to "purify" the Islamic faith from its popular, syncretistic and alternate confessional forms of worship. The Islamic world had always been a locus of international trade and a global network of scholarship. By the 18th century itinerant Sunni scholars crossing between the Middle East, North Africa and Indian Subcontinent made the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, often studying among teachers in the peninsula for years. Among their ranks was Shah Wali Allah (d. 1762) of Delhi, India, whose Sunni revival emerged from and later transcended its Sufi origins.
7 That being said Sunni revivalism was a blip on the radar of Islamic tradition in the Middle East and beyond. It is critical to acknowledge that most Muslims in the 18th century belonged to the mystical Sufi stripe-merging the ancient legal Islamic tradition with native cultural practices from the Middle East, North Africa, India and Southeast Asia. Even today, Muslims are by and large descendants of converts to Sufi Islam, the overwhelming majority of which converted after 1500 CE.
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Back in Arabia, the ebb and flow of perpetual tribal warfare would conquer the Sa'udi state itself twice over the next two centuries. What then can explain the success Wahabi ideology, through such precarious and incredible circumstances? And how has its legacy thrived to this day and profoundly shaped the world in which we live?
Oil Wealth and the Prestige of Wahabi Ideology
Oil and other fossil fuels have shaped the modern world. But the Middle East is not known for an abstract notion of "carbon democracy," but represents rather the standard model of the "rentier state"-a nation where the flow of oil gushes louder than the voice of its people.
9 Moreover, the "oil curse" about which many specialists have investigated is not limited to influencing the politics of the region. Religion, especially Wahabi ideology, owes its triumph to the triumph of the Saudi oil industry. The year is now 1902. 'Abd Al-'Aziz Al- Sa'ud (d. 1953 ) has finally conquered Riyadh and put a decisive end to the Al-Rashid dynasty. He is a brilliant general and is able to defeat the remnants of the collapsed Ottoman empire during and immediately after World War I. over the next three decades, his tribesmen would conquer Arabia from east to west, wresting the title "custodian of the two holy mosques" located in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina from Sharif Husayn b. ' Ali (d. 1931) . Sharif Husayn's alliance with the British could not save him, but it breathed new life into his line with the creation of three new, artificial Arab states, Syria (1922 ), Iraq (1922 ) and Jordan (1923 , to be ruled by his sons with varying success for some time.
10
6 Ibid., 7 correctly asserts Wahabism as an indigenous movement emerging from within Nejd as an independent province, and not a "reaction" to Ottoman or British colonial power. (Balfour 1917; 1948) . European colonialism had dealt the people of the region two decisive blows. The caliphate represented the seat of universal Islamic political authority and symbolic leadership. Its destruction meant the members of the global Muslim community were cut off from its center, and from one another. It also severely mitigated the role of Islamic law (shari'ah) in the lives of everyday Muslims. The creation of Israel against the will of the native Arab population was seen as fundamentally illegitimate, and lead to a series of destructive Israeli-Arab wars beginning in 1948. Various forms of nationalism and Islamism took hold as a means of protest and resistance. There developed within the Muslim community a deep nostalgia for the Caliphate, as well as deep resentment of the Israeli state and its creators in the West. With the humiliating loss of Egypt and its Arab allies to Israel in the 1967 war, and the subsequent Israeli occupation of Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank and Golan Heights, Arab Nationalism lost its popular support, allowing politicized forms of Islamic activism to take center stage. In order to reclaim the Arab lands lost to the Zionist enemy activists from within the Salafi school called for Jihad and the return of the Islamic Caliphate. This branch of Salafism merged with Wahabi ideology and formed a Wahabi-Salafi synthesis. It was the birth of Jihadi-Salafim (al-salifyyah al-jihadiyyah), and it articulated itself in the form of groups of political resistance. 13 Works abound on the rise of Salafism and its contribution to the "Salifization" of modern Islamic tradition. The resulting problem of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East especially is best viewed from within societies where Salafism was active since the 1980s. Cf. e.g. Burhan Ghalioun, Ightiyal al-'aql: mihnat al-thaqafah al-'arabiyyah bayn al-salafiyyah wa al-tab'iyyah, al-Markaz al-Thaqafi al-'Arabi, 2004; Sadiq J. Al-'Azm, Naqd al-fikr al-dini, Beirut: Dar al-Tali'ah, 1982, trans 
The Impact of the Iranian Revolution 1979
In 1979, the US both gained as well as lost allies in the Middle East. That year saw the controversial peace deal between Egypt and Israel. However, it also saw the toppling of the Mohammad Reza Shah (d. , 2009, 152-55, 171, 188, 286, 326. 16 Ibid., 217-224, 333. 17 For more on this see C. Mullen, "The geopolitics of revolution" in Revolutionary Egypt: Connecting Domestic and International Struggles, ed. Reem Abou-El-Fadl, London; New York: Routledge Press, 2015, 190-91. Brotherhood were more determined than ever to assert political power. This caused the Egyptian state much anxiety, which all the while had given sanctuary to the exiled, broken and dying former Shah of Iran. Saudi Arabia, with its council of Wahabi elders, was alarmed by the rise of a new and formidable Shi'ite rival in the region. Sunni students from around the world, including Egypt and Syria, flocked to the seminaries of the Kingdom, including the University of Medina, and returned to their home countries imbued with Wahabi ideology and in some cases a propensity for Salafi-Jihadism. Even the prestigious Al-Azhar University of Egypt was poisoned by Wahabi influence (see earlier).
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The Islamic Republic of Iran also had a crucial impact on Iraq and Syria. Once Egypt had quit the fight against Israel, so to speak, the last gasps of Arab Nationalism lived on in the Ba'ath parties of both Syria and Iraq. Furthermore, as a result of earlier British and French colonial policy the Sunni minority in Iraq and the Alawite (Shi'ite) minority of Syria put Ba'ath against Ba'ath. 
Social Injustice and Jihad Against the Arab States, 1979-2011
Arab Nationalism was all but dead. And new strategic partnerships threatened the status quo. Arab regimes as a whole grew increasingly threatened and repressive. Any and all forms of opposition, minority activism and religious mobilization were brutally crushed by the state. For countries like Egypt and Iraq, however, the strong arm of the police state assured some measure of economic prosperity and political stability through the 1980s. 20 Nevertheless, the complete lack of freedom, increasing corruption by the elite and declining economic fortunes for the working class resulted in endemic, choking and perpetual social injustice. Beginning in the 1990s, the conflict between the Arab police state and its mirror image, militant Salafi-Jihadism emerged. As they say, "for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction." In Egypt, the more the state cracked down, the more terrorist attacks shook the countries once thriving tourist industry. The ever watching eye of the Interior Ministry's police deliberately and preemptively profiled and targeted youth gathering at mosques after Friday prayers, those staying out late at night and especially conservative men wearing beards and dawning religious garb. As a result, mosques were locked up except for the prayer intervals 5 times a day, and all fashions of street peddlers, student activists, juvenile delinquents or anyone caught at the wrong place at the wrong time could be imprisoned, tortured and tried in military courts. Police brutality was the powder keg of Arab State repression. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the popular revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt in 2010-2011 were triggered by two horrific episodes of police brutality.
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Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, citizens of repressive Arab states were increasingly stuck between a rock and a rock place. And the US was itself knowingly complicit in their suffering and misery. Dictatorship 21 The Tunisian revolution started after the self-immolation of a street vender named Mohamed Bouazizi on December 17, 2010, after he was humiliated by a police officer and prevented from making a living. Just a few months earlier in June 6 a young man named Khaled Saeed was beaten to death by Egyptian police bringing the whole country to a boiling point, and paving the way for the Egyptian Revolution in January 25, 2011. was a muddy and brutal business, but it guaranteed stability for US interests. These interests included growing the US energy, defense and aerospace industries, controlling the flow of oil to the international market, weakening Iran's influence in the region, and giving Israel cart blanche to build illegal settlements in the West Bank.
22 Anti-US sentiment spread among the public-Jihadist and pacifist alike-because the Whitehouse and Among the Israeli-Arab wars is the former's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which was part of the long and bloody Lebanese civil war fought between [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . Leaving aside the details of this conflict, the occupation of Shi'a dominated southern Lebanon gave rise to a local resistance movement called the Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO). Iran became its permanent backer and the group changed its name to Hezbollah (lit. "the party of God"). Hamas and Hezbollah may be considered terrorist organizations to Western nations whose interest they threaten, but they have been and remain, for better or worse, state actors in the Middle East for well over 30 years. Their call to Jihad against Israeli aggression, moreover, especially the suffocating blockage of Gaza since 2006, has received a great deal of sympathy and popular support. But that's not all. Supporting Jihad against Israel has itself become a deeply divisive force in the Middle East. Iran's presence in the Levant through Hezbollah, has made Hamas a political football between other states in the region. 
From Cold War to Gulf War, 1979-2007: The Taliban and Al-Qaeda
The Cold War was fought-among other places-in the Middle East. Governments as well as anti-government rebel groups received American and Soviet military, logistical and political support. The immediate consequence of playing this dangerous game was the collapse of states, which to date have never fully recovered, creating deadly power vacuums. The indirect consequence, however, was the renewed call to Jihad yet again-this time against the interventionism of the Soviets and Americans on opposing sides-and the subsequent globalization of Salafi-Jihadi operations, culminating in Al-Qaeda.
26
The Soviet War in Afghanistan (1979-89) brought about a people's resistance supported by the US and known to the world as the Mujahideen (lit. "those who undertake Jihad"). Presidents Jimmy Carter and later Ronald Reagan (d. 2004) were directly supporting Jihad in Afghanistan to the tune of billions of dollars. On the ground the Soviets met with stiff resistance from an alliance of native Afghani Pashtuns, foreign Jihadi-Salfist fighters coming mainly from Arab states, and president Zia-ul-Haq (d. 1988) of Pakistan who had no qualms about manipulating Jahadist groups for military gains. Among the ranks of the Salafi-Jihadists was a towering figure from a well respected Saudi family who came to lead the Mujahideen. This was none other than Osama bin Laden (d. 2011) . Having helped win the war against the Soviets, Bin Laden was determined to continue his campaign of Jihad in other conflicts. He had the personal wealth, leadership and prestige to start the organization called the "Jihadist base camp" (qa'idat al-jihad), otherwise known as Al-Qaeda. After attempts to set up Al-Qaeda in Sudan, Bin Laden was denounced by the Saudi government in 1992, and he was forced back into Afghanistan where starting in 1996 it thrived under the support of Mullah Umar and the Taliban government. From Chechnya, Bosnia, Kashmir and wherever he perceived that political struggles threatened Muslim lives, Global Jihad now had a permanent home in the mountains Tora Bora.
This period was no less tumultuous for Iraq or Iran. A staple of US foreign policy in the region, since the overthrow of the Shah in 1979 and until today, was regime change in Iran. The Whitehouse befriended president Saddam Hussein of Iraq and helped bankroll his military mayhem and massacres for an entire decade. Iraq invaded Iran, and the war lasted eight long years from 1980 to 1988 making it one of the longest in the 20th century, and resulting in more than one million lives lost. 27 The war also sowed the seeds of sectarian conflict for decades to come, between Sunni and Shia, and between Arab and Persian. The US and its European allies supplied Saddam with the "weapons of mass destruction" they later demanded he turn over. 
George W. Bush
In the coming weeks, months and years, the intensification of US military intervention in the region would fuel Salafi-Jihadism like never before. President George W. Bush waged a global "war on terror," beginning in 2001, against the Taliban, and then brought "shock and awe" to Saddam's Ba'ath regime in Iraq in 2003. Bush's rhetoric, furthermore, fed right into the clash of civilizations worldview espoused by Salafi-Jihadism, describing his war as a "crusade" in September 17, 2001, and proclaiming to the world three days later, "you're either with us or you're with the terrorists." 30 To add fuel to the blaze, the war on Iraq was illegal and based on falsified evidence. In other words, the war received the condemnation of the UN secretary general Koffi Anan; there were no "weapons of mass destruction;" and everyone knew that it was impossible for Saddam Hussein to have any connection with Osama Bin Laden.
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In 2002, the US opened up the Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp and filled it with prisoners from the so-called war on terror. Some were Salafi-Jihadists and Al-Qaeda types, but the overwhelming majority were not guilty of any crime approaching terrorism. Many were subjected to torture, otherwise ascribed the euphemism "enhanced interrogation techniques. (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) , Lebanese civil war (1975 Lebanese civil war ( -1991 , Algerian civil war (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) and ongoing Iraqi civil conflict (2003-) . 35 There are a number of online videos to this effect dating from late 2011 and early 2012, i.e. before the tidal wave of Salafi-Jihadism came to dominate large swaths of the Syrian countryside and cities in the east. See also 'Arabi Wadili, "Amir al-zabadani-Min hilm al-khilafah ila al-bahth 'an malazz," Al-Safir, August 29, 2015. 36 The rejection and forcible dismantling of democratically elected Islamist governments is not without precedent in the region, where Hamas was isolated and after their 2006 electoral victory in Gaza in 2006, and which followed the 1990 electoral victory of the Front Islamique du Salut in Algeria was aborted by the military, leading to the country's bloody civil war.
of al-Raqqa in 2013 and descended upon Mosul on June 9th 2014, which immediately capitulated after years of repression from the Malki regime. ISIS then changed its name to simply the Islamic State (IS) and al-Baghdadi appointed himself caliph-answering the call of radicalized and dejected youth calling for the return of the caliphate since 2011. This was the fruition of prophecy.
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Hardened by a decade of merciless sectarian warfare, funded by wealthy Salafi-Jihadist interests and determined to bring about the foretold end of days in Syria, ISIS fighters have massacred, tortured, raped, enslaved and desecrated people as well as world heritage. Despite the pornography its violence, 38 we should keep in mind that the scale of ISIS' barbarism is merely that of any war-including the war on terror (see earlier 
Finding Answers
I take you back to the very beginning of this paper, to the iconoclasm of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahab, the sectarianism of Ibn Taymiyyah, and the sacred history of the Hadith tradition and cherry picked Qur'an verses. These very traditions-among others-are explicitly cited as justification by ISIS in its execution videos. The reason that Salafi-Jihadist groups generally, and Al-Qaeda and ISIS specifically, have recourse to such traditions is because they were recorded during times of war. That is to say Ibn 'Abd al-Wahab's ideology allowing Muslims to kill Muslims functions in a historical bubble where warfare between neighboring tribes was the norm. Similarly, Ibn Taymiyya's incitement against the Shi'a came as a direct result of their perceived collaboration with the Mongols who had recently and brutally conquered the region-i.e. during the major medieval seismic shift in the Middle East. The same analogy can be made with the Hadith traditions, which many claim go back to the salaf, especially Abu Bakr (d. 634) and Khalid b. al-Walid (d. 642) whose wars of apostasy (hurub al-riddah) represent large scale tribal warfare. These are dark episodes of history, but for Salafi-Jihadists who hold history itself as sacred, it offers an opportunity to articulate their identity and fulfill prophecy.
Furthermore, the spread of Wahabi ideology along well established networks of medieval scholarship and modern oil economies, coupled with the European conquest of the Ottoman empire, tied the dream of the caliphate' return with the act of Jihad, and some would add the apocalypse. 41 Of course, the main reason such ideas are even remotely persuasive among the segments of youth in the region is the widespread injustice and economic as well as political unrest. Notwithstanding this fact, I reiterate that all Islamic institutions and even leading members of the Salafi-Jihadist camp have condemned ISIS and its distortion of Islam. ISIS may be a monster, but it is the monster of our own creation and devices. It took decades to make and will take decades to unmake. One thing amply demonstrated in this paper is that religion is not the only factor in the problem of ISIS in the Middle East. Its root causes may be expressed as follows:
(1) Oil rich Arab Gulf states packaging and exporting Wahabi-Salafi ideology as though it were mainstream Islam;
(2) The repression of Arab police states, economic hardship and lack of social justice; (3) Western-often US and Israeli-military intervention, destabilizing the region.
